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RECENT DECISIONS
In the instant case, the Court followed settled law and refused
to reduce the lump sum payments. Limited to the dispute between
the parties, the decision is just. The plaintiff was ready, willing and
able to perform her part of the agreement.' 9 The defendant prevented
her performance by refusing to return the children. Therefore, he
should not be heard to complain. However, the courts should not
deny reductions in every case simply because the agreement does not
specifically provide for the reductions. The rights of the wife must
be protected, and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it
should be presumed that no reduction was intended. Nevertheless,
the courts should look to the entire agreement, and wherever possible,
give effect to reductions which are not specifically spelled out but
which were obviously intended by the parties.20  One such instance
would be an agreement which provides for a reduction when the chil-
dren reach their majority. Such a provision logically leads to the
conclusion that the parties intended that a reduction take place when
the wife was no longer supporting the children. Consequently, a
reduction could be granted if the wife failed to support the children,
despite the fact that the children had not yet reached their majority.
By giving the intended effect to this and like provisions, the courts
will be accomplishing practical justice without interfering with the
sanctity of contracts.
TORTS - FELA WRONGFUL DEATH RECOVERY PRECLUDES
SUBSEQUENT STATE ACTION AGAINST EMPLOYER. -The plaintiff-
administratrix recovered damages but no funeral expenses in a prior
action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act' for injuries re-
sulting in the death of her intestate, an employee of the defendant. In
a subsequent wrongful death action 2 for damages and funeral ex-
would be tantamount to reforming one provision of the agreement while leav-
ing the rest of the agreement intact. See note 4 supra.19 There was no showing or claim of any unfitness on the part of the wife
to care for the children. The decision and order in the habeas corpus proceed-
ing were based upon a finding that the happiness, welfare and best interests of
the children would be served if their custody, at least for the present, were
awarded to the father. This finding in turn seemed to be based upon the
children's refusal to live with the mother and their manifest preference for
the father.20 This method was employed with notable success in Matter of Herzog,
301 N.Y. 127, 93 N.E.2d 336 (1950).
'35 STAT. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1952) (hereinafter
referred to as FELA). This Act was declared constitutional in Second Em-
ployers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912).
2 N.Y. DEc. EsT. LAW §§ 130-134.
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penses against the same employer, the Court dismissed the complaint.
Held: the administratrix was barred by her prior recovery under the
FELA which was her exclusive remedy, even though recovery of
funeral expenses was denied. Montemarano v. New York Central
R.R., 205 Misc. 463, 129 N.Y.S.2d 527 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
The liability of railroad employers engaged in interstate com-
merce to their employees for negligent injuries is regulated by the
FELA. Where it is applicable, the FELA is a paramount and ex-
clusive remedy 3 which supersedes state laws.4  To fall within the
purview of the Act, there must have existed an employer-employee
relationship at the time the cause of action arose.5 It is also essential
that both the employer 6 and the employee 7 be engaged in interstate
commerce when the injury occurs. The failure of the employee to
establish either of these elements renders the FELA inapplicable,
8
but in such a case he is not barred from proceeding against the same
defendant under appropriate state laws.9 However, if the FELA is
applicable, it is the injured employee's sole remedy and if he fails to
prove negligence he is precluded from proceeding against the same
defendant under less stringent state laws.' 0
While the FELA is the exclusive remedy as against an employer
engaged in interstate commerce, it does not control the liability of
$New York Cent. R.R. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147 (1917); Second Em-
ployers' Liability Cases, supra note 1. "This great principle is, that the con-
stitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof are supreme; that they control
the constitution and laws of the respective States, and cannot be controlled by
them." M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 426 (U.S. 1819).
4 Second Employers' Liability Cases, supra note 1.
535 STAT. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§51-60 (1952).
6 Wabash Ry. v. Bridal, 94 F.2d 117 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S.
602 (1938). Continuity of movement of the commodity being transported is
the concluding factor in determining whether the employer was engaged in
interstate commerce. Nordgard v. Marysville & Northern Ry., 211 Fed. 721
(W.D. Wash.), aff'd, 218 Fed. 737 (9th Cir. 1914), aff'd, 243 U.S. 36 (1917).
A carrier may operate wholly within one state and still be a part of interstate
commerce if the carrier is a cog or step in the continuous transportation of a
commodity from one state to another. See Sherman v. Southern Pac. Co., 34
Cal. App.2d 490, 93 P.2d 812 (1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 669 (1940).
7 Shanks v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 239 U.S. 556 (1916); Delaware,
L. & W.R.R. v. Yurkonis, 238 U.S. 439 (1915); see New York, N.H. & H.R.R.
v. Bezue, 284 U.S. 415, 420 (1932); Kettner v. Industrial Comm'n, 258 Wis.
615, 46 N.W.2d 833, 834-835 (1951).
8 Shanks v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., supra note 7; Delaware, L. & W.ZR.R
v. Yurkonis, supra note 7.9 Jackson v. Industrial Board, 280 Ill. 526, 117 N.E. 705 (1917) (Though
administratrix brought an action under FELA for the death of an employee
which was dismissed on the ground that the employee was not engaged in
interstate commerce, the bringing of such suit did not prevent her from filing
a claim under the Workmen's Compensation Act.).
10 New York Cent. R.R. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147 (1917), reversing 216
N.Y. 284, 110 N.E. 614 (1915); Erie R.R. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 170 (1917),
reversing 88 N.J.L. 619, 96 Atl. 394 (1916).
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other tortfeasors who may be instrumental in causing injury to the
employee. 1 Therefore, where the employer and a third party are
jointly responsible for an employee's injury, the employee must seek
redress against the employer under the FELA, while his remedy
against the third party must be pursued under state laws. Thus, the
Act does not govern the liability of negligent fellow servants,12 non-
employer interstate carriers, 13 and other third-party joint tort-
feasors 14 though they are jointly responsible with the employer in
causing the injury. If the employee elects to sue his employer under
the FELA, recovery in a second suit against other negligent parties
cannot include damages that could have been recovered from the
employer.15
The damages recoverable in a wrongful death action under the
FELA are limited to the pecuniary loss sustained by the decedent's
survivors.' 6  The Act does not specifically provide for funeral ex-
penses 17 and the courts have consequently held that such expenses
are not proper items of damage to be recovered thereunder.' 8  In the
instant case, the Court was called upon to decide whether a prior
FELA recovery would bar a second action under state law against
the same employer although the damages sought were not recoverable
under FELA. Though the question was a new one for the Court,
it was decided according to the exclusive remedy doctrine. The
Hoffman 19 case, upon which the plaintiff relied, is distinguishable.
The plaintiff in that case recovered funeral expenses under a state
statute after having previously recovered damages for pecuniary loss
against the employer under FELA. In the second suit, however,
the defendant was not the employer, as in the instant case, but a
joint tortfeasor. Hence, the exclusive remedy doctrine had no
application.
11 Cott v. Erie R.R., 231 N.Y. 67, 131 N.E. 737, cert. denied, 257 U.S. 636
(1921) ; Lee v. Central of Georgia Ry., 147 Ga. 428, 94 S.E. 558 (1917), aff'd,
252 U.S. 109 (1920).
12 Lee v. Central of Georgia Ry., supra note 11.
13 Cott v. Erie R.R., spra note 11; Southern Ry. v. Alien, 88 Ga. App. 435,
77 S.E.2d 277 (1953).
14 See Schosboek v. Chicago, M. St. P. & P.R.R., 191 Wash. 425, 71 P.2d
548, 549 (1937).
15 See, e.g., Hoffman v. Reading Co., 12 F. Supp. 1010 (D.N.J. 1935). The
plaintiff recovered a judgment against the employer under the FELA. An
action was then brought under the Pennsylvania death act against a joint tort-
feasor. The court allowed recovery of funeral expenses since they were not
recoverable under the FELA but denied recovery of damages to infant daughter
for anticipatory pecuniary loss since FELA allows such items of damage.
16 Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59 (1913).
1735 STAT. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1952).
18 Delaware, L. & W.R.R. v. Hughes, 240 Fed. 941 (2d Cir. 1917); see
Collins v. Pennsylvania R.R., 163 App. Div. 452, 459, 148 N.Y. Supp. 777,
781-782 (4th Dep't 1914).
10 Hoffman v. Reading Co., supra note 15.
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In 1917, the utter exclusiveness of the Act was emphasized with
great force in the Winfield 20 case where the court held that the
FELA irrespective of the issue of negligence, was the exclusive rem-
edy of the employee; he could not take advantage of the state work-
men's compensation laws which do not require proof of negligence.
Thus, some workers unable to prove negligence were left without a
remedy. Then in 1939, an amendment to the FELA 21 extended the
exclusive remedy doctrine to include additional employees by relax-
ing the test to be applied in determining whether the employee is
engaged in interstate commerce.
22
It cannot be denied that the FELA, at the time of its enactment,
was extremely beneficial to that class of workers within its scope. 23
However, forty-six significant years have passed since then, during
which the concept of compensation without negligence for industrial
accidents has taken hold in the form of state workmen's compensation
acts.24 Without being restricted to the FELA, employees of railroad
carriers engaged in interstate commerce could qualify under these
state acts. However, as a result of the Winfield decision, such em-
ployees must look to the FELA for relief, in some instances, hope-
lessly. It is submitted that the good intended to be accomplished by
the Act is not being realized today. Modern concepts of compensation
for industrial accidents indicate a need for a reconsideration of the
FELA in light of the effect of the Winfield decision.
20New York Cent. R.R. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147 (1917), reversing 216
N.Y. 284, 110 N.E. 614 (1915).
2153 STAT. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. §51 (1952).
22 See Ermin v. Pennsylvania R.R., 36 F. Supp. 936, 940 (E.D.N.Y. 1941);
Great Northern Ry. v. Industrial Comm'n, 245 Wis. 375, 14 N.W.2d 152, 154
(1944). The Act was extended to those employees, any of whose duties shall
"... in any way directly or closely and substantially, affect such commerce. .. "
(emphasis added). Prior to this amendment, the test was whether ". . . the
employ6 at the time of the injury [was] engaged in interstate transportation
or in work so closely related to it as to be practically a part of it." (emphasis
added). Shanks v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 239 U.S. 556, 558 (1916). For
an excellent discussion of the effect of the 1939 amendment on workmen's
compensation, see Miller, Av Interpretation Of The Act Of 1939 (FELA) To
Save Some Remedies For Compensation Claimants, 18 LAW & CONTMP. PROB.
241 (1953).
23 See New York Cent. R.R. v. Winfield, supra note 20 at 159-162 (dissent-
ing opinion) (discussion of the need for the abrogation of certain common-law
defenses prior to the FELA).
24 At the time the FELA was enacted the states had not yet passed work-
men's compensation acts. See Delisi, Scope of the Federal Employers' Liability
Act-Recent Developments, 18 Miss. L.J. 206, 208 (1947).
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